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Abstract
In this paper we present a model of the interplay between learn-
ing, incentives and the allocation of decision rights in the context of
a generalized agency problem. Within this context, not only actors
face conﬂicting interests but diverging cognitive “visions” of the right
course of action as well. We show that a principal may obtain the
implementation of desired organizational policies by means of appro-
priate incentives or by means of appropriate design of the allocation
of decisions, when the latter is cheaper but more complex. We also
show that when the principal is uncertain about which course of action
is more appropriate and wants to learn it from the environment, or-
ganizational structure and incentives interact in non-trivial ways and
must be carefully tuned. When learning is not at stake, incentives and
organizational structure are substitutes. When instead learning is at
stake, organizational structure and incentives may complement each
other and have to be ﬁne tuned according to the complexity of the
learning process and the competitive pressure which is put on fast or
slow learning.
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1In order to arrive at what you do not know
You must go by a way which is the way of ignorance
T. S. Eliot, East Coker, 1940
1 Introduction
Broadly speaking, the main cutting divide between organizational economics
and the evolutionary and capabilities approaches should probably be looked
for in the way in which ﬁrms’ speciﬁcity as coordination devices is represented
and analyzed. In particular, it seems that the fundamental epistemological
diﬀerences between the two research streams are grounded on the adoption
of diﬀerent mind-sets and primitive notions.
Organizational economics takes incentives and governance as its primitives
and mainly describes ﬁrms as contract- and/or hierarchy-based solutions to
market failures. Its main concern is the problem of eﬃcient allocation of given
resources and given capabilities and its key research questions are the design
of optimal information and incentive systems that, in a static context, boils
down to a problem of optimal allocation of risk (Jensen and Meckling 1976,
Fama 1980), of optimal information structures (Sah and Stiglitz 1986, Radner
1993), of optimal allocation of property rights (Hart and Moore 1990), of
control, decision and exclusion rights (Bester 2009, Rajan and Zingales 1998),
depending on which informational or incentive problem the analysis is focused
upon.
The evolutionary and capabilities approaches1, quite on the contrary, ﬁnd
their “primitives” for the analysis of the nature of economic organizations
in their problem-solving features. The latter, in turn, are viewed as embed-
ded in some form of human bounded rationality, in imperfect processes of
learning and diverse mechanisms of social distribution of “cognitive labor”.
In this perspective, ﬁrms are conceived of as the main place for the creation
and implementation of productive knowledge. Learning and adaptation are
the main concerns of this research perspective and the key research questions
concern how capabilities are acquired and modiﬁed and what are the organi-
zational structures and processes that favor the generation of organizational
capabilities quite independently from any issue of incentive compatibility and
1There are indeed important diﬀerence between evolutionary and capabilities theories of
the ﬁrm (see for instance Dosi, Faillo, and Marengo (2008)), but for the present discussion
these diﬀerences do not seem fundamental.
2transaction governance.
A real confrontation between the two theories is somehow diﬃcult because
they largely lack a common ground. Organizational economics has strongly
emphasized the role of incentives in organizations, reﬂecting the overall idea
that the role of institutions and organizations is basically to mitigate the
negative consequences of opportunism by setting the right incentives and/or
the right governance structure. The capabilities view often makes the implicit
assumption that individual motivation plays little or no role in the generation
and accumulation of capabilities, or at least that incentive compatibility can
be loosely assumed.
Last but not least, the two traditions have also important diﬀerences in
methodology that make cross-communication diﬃcult: organizational eco-
nomics is deeply embedded in the neoclassical tradition of abstract analyti-
cal modeling based upon the standard toolbox of rationality and equilibrium
behavior, while the capabilities view is usually oriented towards appreciative
theorizing and assumes individuals with strong bounds in rationality and
knowledge. Moreover, sometimes it assumes that there might well exist or-
ganizational dimensions that are not necessarily reducible to the individual
behaviors of its members (more on the relations between the two theories in,
e.g., Foss (2000)).
Some existing attempts of bridging the gaps of the two streams of research
have been made (Langlois and Foss 1999, Dosi, Levinthal, and Marengo 2003,
Coriat and Dosi 1998, Nickerson and Zenger 2004, Kaplan and Henderson
2005), but on the whole it is not unfair to say that the organizational eco-
nomics literature has very little to say on learning and capabilities creation
and that the capabilities literature does not deal in a satisfactory way with
the role of incentives, delegation and power in the creation and modiﬁcation
of capabilities. In other words, at one extreme one ﬁnds a theory that to
some extent censors any competence issue associated with what organiza-
tions do and how well they do it except for issues of misrepresentations of
intrinsic individual abilities and adverse selection, or incentive misalignment
in eﬀort elicitation. At the other extreme, one ﬁnds a theory that censors
precisely the incentive-alignment issue, in a sense pretending that all agents
are perfectly benevolent cooperators as far as their individual motives are
concerned. At the very same time, it focuses on the problem solving eﬃcacy
of what they do, especially in so far as what they do primarily stems from
the social division of labor.
3In this paper we make a novel attempt at bridging this gap that, we be-
lieve, makes some non trivial steps forward. Painted with an extremely broad
brush, our contribution amounts to adding two dimensions to the the general
picture. The ﬁrst is a political one: in our model there exists a social function
for power that amounts to the possibility given to a principal of structuring
and constraining agents’ adaptive search both through (re)allocating deci-
sion rights and through implementing diﬀerent incentive mechanisms. On
the other hand, we explore the main properties of this function of power
in agency relations in which conﬂict arises not only from diverging interests
but also from diverging views of the appropriate courses of actions or from
diﬀerent representations of the world. The second dimension we add is thus
a cognitive one. Our main focus is on how a principal has to choose between
the two forms of power - i.e. changing organizational structure and ﬁne tun-
ing incentives - in order to maximize his utility. As we will show, these two
dimensions interact in non trivial ways depending both on the nature and
the representation of the problem at hand.
We present an abstract model of the interplay between organizational
structure, incentives and learning and we focus on the interaction between
the allocation of decision rights and incentives when the organization is fac-
ing complex problems, i.e. problems in which the organizational behavior is
the outcome of the interaction of many interdependent decisions with strong
externalities, both positive and negative. We show that allocation of decision
rights and incentives are largely substitutes: a principal can obtain a desired
course of action by appropriate reallocation of decision rights and/or by pro-
viding appropriate monetary incentives to the agents. The former strategy,
i.e. acting on the organizational design, is very powerful and less expensive
and we show that in general by increasing the division of decision making
rights the principal may have her policies more easily implemented.
The picture becomes more blurred and complicated when the principal
does not know the appropriate course of action but tries to learn it from
environmental feed-back. In this circumstances the principal is facing a dif-
ﬁcult trade-oﬀ. By using eﬃciently the organizational structure (i.e. the
allocation of decision rights) and/or the incentives, she may get her policy
more eﬃciently implemented, but she runs the risk of curbing those agents’
alternative visions that may prove very useful for collective learning. This
trade-oﬀ is an instance of the widely discussed exploitation vs. exploration
trade-oﬀ (March 1991), in the sense that stronger incentives increase the con-
4trol of the principal who may obtain a stricter implementation of the required
policies (exploitation) but for the same reason they limit the exploration of
alternative policies that agents may autonomously choose. A careful tuning
of the trade-oﬀ between the organization of decision rights and incentives is
therefore a key issue.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we describe the main
issues involved in the interaction between incentives, organizational structure
and learning. In section 3 we outline the model and we study its main
properties. Results are presented in sections 4 and 5 where we discuss the
behavior of the model respectively when the principal knows precisely what
she wants to get from the agents and when instead she tries to learn what
are the best courses of actions. In section 6 we analyze how incentives and
organizational structures cope with the complexity problem generated by the
interdependencies (externalities) among the agents. Finally, in section 7 we
conclude and suggest some directions for further developments.
2 Generalized agency relations in learning and
adaptation
Organizational economics usually assumes that conﬂict in organizations arises
because individuals have diverging objectives. A typical agency model as-
sumes a principal’s utility increasing in the result, decreasing in the salary
paid to the agent and indiﬀerent with respect to the latter’s eﬀort. On the
contrary, the agent’s utility increases in salary, decreases in eﬀort and is
indiﬀerent to the result. Recent literature on social preferences has chal-
lenged these conventional assumptions and has highlighted that principals
and agents may indeed care about each other’s utility (Fehr and Fischbacher
2002), for instance because agents tend to reciprocate generous (incentive in-
compatible) oﬀers of high compensations with generous provisions of eﬀort.
But if the principal’s and the agent’s decisions depend on the perceived be-
havior and attitude of the other, then the social and organizational context in
which interaction takes place may indeed inﬂuence the parties’ perceptions.
For instance, many researchers have pointed out that monetary incentives
may have a crowding out eﬀect against cooperation as they are perceived as
a signal of lack of trust (Fehr and G¨ achter 2002, Frey and Jegen 2001).
In this paper we investigate a complementary issue: we assume that agents
5are not indiﬀerent to the result, because they have not only preferences and
interests, but also cognition, ideas, visions about what the organizational
course of action should be, well beyond the mere interest in maximizing the
salary net of eﬀort costs. Without downplaying the role of diverging inter-
ests, it must be recognized that also diverging views are an important source
of conﬂict in organizations. Everyone who has had some managing role in a
business, academic or governmental organization has probably experienced
such conﬂict: people simply have diﬀerent ideas about what should be done
and how it should be done. Often such diﬀerent ideas can only partly, or
not all, be ascribed to their self interest. Agents hold diverging and motiva-
tionally strong views for the mere fact that they sincerely believe that their
intended course of action is good for the organization’s interest and attach
high value to this belief. Conﬂict arising from diverging interests and conﬂict
arising from diverging views are often strictly intertwined: a manager of a
division or department may think that more resources must be allocated to
the unit she manages both because she believes to the best of her knowledge
that this will serve the organization’s objectives (and indeed this may prove
right) and because she looks for private beneﬁts that she may reap in terms
of higher salary, power, visibility and prestige.
People do indeed hold diﬀerent views of what should be done, how things
should be managed, which alternative courses of actions should be followed
also because, in good faith, they think diﬀerently about how the same or-
ganizational objectives could be better achieved. This source of conﬂict is
likely to be especially relevant when non-routine decisions have to be taken,
when new hard problems are being faced, when strong procedural uncertainty
characterizes the current situation, when organizational and or technological
change is needed, that is, in all those situations in which non-routine courses
of action must be envisaged and what must be done is far from obvious and
uncontroversial. In such circumstances, organizations do not have to ﬁnd
optimally eﬃcient allocations of given resources, but have to design complex
procedures that may provide valuable solutions to ill-structured problems
(Simon 1981). However, in such situations, diﬀerent visions are also a funda-
mental source of learning. When the principal does not know exactly what
should be done, she may learn from the agents’ ideas. In this respect, the
standard solution to the problem of conﬂict suggested by agency model, that
is aligning the agents’ preferences with the principal’s, may actually prove
detrimental and curb this important source of learning through diversity.
6Agency conﬂict is a source of ineﬃciency and incentives are needed in or-
der to correct for misalignment of objectives. As well known, in the presence
of information asymmetries and with risk-averse agents, perfect alignment
is usually impossible and full eﬃciency cannot be restored (Fama 1980).
However, when conﬂict arises because of diﬀerent views of what must be
done, alignment may be diﬃcult also lacking information asymmetries be-
cause agents are concerned with organizational actions and with their in-
dividual eﬀort as well. In such cases actions and decisions by some agents
tend to produce externalities on the other agents that may be both positive
(agent i chooses an action that is aligned with what agent j thinks should be
done) or negative (when an agent i’s action diﬀers from what agent j would
have chosen in that situation). Such negative and positive externalities are a
source of complexity that contractual arrangements can hardly manage opti-
mally (Bernholz 1997). Moreover, and more importantly, alignment may not
be desirable because agents’ cognitions, ideas and visions may prove partly
or totally superior to the principal’s. If the latter succeeds in obtaining a
perfect implementation of her desired actions, she looses the opportunity of
discovering better ones that agents may know.
In this paper we suppose that principals and agents hold diﬀerent views
of an articulated course of action that we model by way of a vector of in-
terdependent policies. The principal has both a problem of implementation
of the wanted policies and a problem of inadequacy of what she believes the
right policies are. In order to solve these two problems she can act on the
allocation of decisions among agents2, and on the incentives, i.e. trying to
modify the agents’ preferences. We will show that in our model allocation
of decision rights and incentives can either be substitute or complements,
depending on whether learning is at stake or not.
In the business strategy literature, the former problem is referred to as
the strategy implementation problem (Hrebiniak and Joyce 1984) and con-
sidered as a source of ineﬃciency. The organization is viewed as knowing an
appropriate course of action but for a variety of incentive and coordination
reasons is not realizing that set of policies. But an alternative view, e.g. the
literature on emergent strategy (Mintzberg 1973, Burgelman 1994) suggests
that the divergence between expressed strategy and actual behavior may be
2In a recent paper, Canice Prendergast suggests a somehow similar and complementary
framework by developing a model in which the principal’s main tool for alleviating incentive
problems is to hire the right agent in the right position (Prendergast 2009).
7a favorable circumstance. The search and discovery that results from such
discrepancies may yield the identiﬁcation of a superior set of actions than
that which would be suggested by the conscious choice of strategy.
In the following section we outline a model that should help clarifying
these trade-oﬀs under more rigorous terms.
3 The model
We consider a ﬁrm that has to take decisions on a set of n policies P =
{p1,p2,...,pn}. For simplicity we assume that each policy may take only
two values pi ∈ {0,1} and therefore the set of policies if formed by the 2n




n] one generic element thereof.
We concentrate on those cases in which policies interact with each other in
complex ways to determine the overall organizational performance. Decisions
on single policy items generate externalities, both positive and negative, on
other policies. Thus the determination of the correct combination of policies
is a complex task as the performance contribution of a single policy item
depends upon the value taken by other policies. Complementarity and su-
peradditivity (Milgrom and Roberts 1992) among policies are special cases.
We suppose that policy vectors have an exogenously determined perfor-
mance ordering that we call “nature’s” ordering and write ≻N. If xi ≻N xj
then policy vector xi has strictly higher performance than vector xj. Nature’s
ordering determines a policy landscape - i.e. the coupling of every policy vec-
tor with its performance - whose ruggedness3 reﬂects the extent of interde-
pendencies among policies and thus the complexity of the problem of ﬁnding
the best performing policy vector(s) (Levinthal 1997, Page 1996, Rivkin and
Siggelkow 2005)4. In the analysis and the simulation exercises below we
will consider, unless otherwise speciﬁed, a generic complete and transitive
ordering of policy vectors, without any further restriction.
Our organization is composed by a principal Π and a number of agents
that may range from 1 up to n. Each agent is attributed decision rights over
3In our model a policy landscape is highly rugged when modiﬁcations of one policy
item determines large variations in the overall performance.
4Actually these papers assume a ﬁtness function, that is (random) assignments of
performance level to each policy vector, usually normalized in the interval [0,1]. For our
model we do not need ﬁtness (or performance) values but simply a complete and transitive
performance ordering for policy vectors.
8a subset of policies. Let A = {a1,a2,...,ah}, with 1 ≤ h ≤ n, be a set of
agents and let each agent be associated to a non-empty subset of policies
under his control. More precisely, let di ⊆ P be a generic non-empty subset
of the set of policies. We call a decomposition of decision rights a partition5




di = X with di
\
dj = ∅ , ∀i  = j
We call organizational structure O a mapping of the set D onto the set
A of agents, i.e. a mapping that assigns each subset of policies to one and
only one agent, i.e. O : D  → A. Note that, for simplicity, we assume that
the principal does not directly control any policy item.
Assuming for instance four policy items, the following are possible orga-
nizational structures:
• {a1 ← {p1,p2,p3,p4}}, i.e. one agent has control on all four policies
• {a1 ← {p1},a2 ← {p2},a3 ← {p3},a4 ← {p4}}, i.e. four agents have
each control on one policy
• {a1 ← {p1,p2},a2 ← {p3,p4}}, i.e. two agents have each control on
two policies
• {a1 ← {p1},a2 ← {p2,p3,p4}}, i.e. two agents with “asymmetric”
responsibilities: one has control on the ﬁrst policy item and the other
on the remaining three
Finally, the organizational structure may also be characterized by an
agenda α = ai1,ai2,...,aih, that is a permutation of the set of agents deﬁning
the sequence with which agents are called to decide upon the policy items
under their control.
We suppose that the principal and the agents have each an idiosyncratic
ordering over the entire space X of policy vectors that may or may not cor-
respond to nature’s ordering ≻N. The principal is interested in the overall
5Actually we could also allow for some decision rights to be ambiguously allocated, so
that two or more agents are entitled to modify the same policy. This phenomenon, which
is often found in real organizations, can be easily modeled in our framework but we leave
it to future investigation.
9performance of the organization but may not know how to achieve this objec-
tive, i.e. her ordering over the policies space may diﬀer from nature’s. Anal-
ogously, each agent has an idiosyncratic ordering of policy vectors, which, in
general, diﬀers from nature’s, the principal’s and the other agents’, reﬂecting
the agent’s idiosyncratic vision, interest, and cognition. Moreover, such or-
dering concerns the entire set of policies, not only those under the control of
the agent himself. We call  Π the principal’s ordering and  ai the ordering
held by agent i. We assume that all such individual orderings are complete
and transitive, i.e. that if xi  k xj and xj  k xl then xi  k xl, where k may
indicate the principal or any agent.
When asked to decide upon two alternative proﬁles for the policies under
his control, an agent will choose the one that ranks higher in his own order-
ing, given the current state of the other policy items that are not under his
control, unless the principal gives appropriate monetary incentives to over-
ride the agent’s preference and induce him to make a diﬀerent choice. For
the sake of simplicity we make a simple linearity assumption and suppose
that the incentives needed to induce an agent to accept a policy proﬁle that
ranks lower in his ordering is proportional to the diﬀerence of the rankings
of the two alternatives. Suppose, for instance, that agent ai has to choose
between two policy vectors xi and xj (of course the vectors may diﬀer only
in items under the agent’s control) that rank respectively rank(xi) = ri and
rank(xj) = rj with ri < rj, indicating that he prefers xi to xj
6. Of course
the agent would choose vector xi and if the principal wants to reverse the
choice has to pay c(rj − ri) where c is, for simplicity, constant and equal for
all agents. We could interpret c as an extra monetary incentive the principal
has to give to the agent in addition to the standard compensation needed to
elicit a normal level of eﬀort, which in turn may depend upon the agent’s
commitment, motivation and so on.
We suppose that at the outset an initial “status quo” policy vector is
(randomly) given7. Then the ﬁrst – according to the agenda – agent may
modify the policies under his control. He generates all the sub-vectors for
the policies under his control and chooses the one that, together with current
policies that are not under his control, will determine the vector he prefers,
unless payments from the principal induce him to make a diﬀerent choice.
6We use the convention that if the agent strictly prefers xi to xj then ri < rj and that
the agent’s mostly preferred policy x0 has rank rank(x0) = 1.
7In what follows we usually ﬁnd properties for all possible initial policy vectors.
10When the ﬁrst agent in the agenda has taken a decision, the value he has
chosen for the policies under his control become part of the new status quo.
Then the same procedure is repeated for the second, third, ..., h−th agents
in the agenda. Once all agents have operated on the policies under their
control, we may either assume that the procedure comes to a halt or that
the agenda is repeated over and over again until an optimum or a cycle are
encountered. A (local) optimum is a policy vector for which no agent ﬁnds
it convenient or possible8 to modify items under his control according to the
procedure outlined so far. A cycle is instead a subset of policy vectors among
which agents keep cycling.
In the sequel we will investigate both stopping rules. Of course if the
agenda is repeated only once cycles are ruled out and the organization will
reach a decision but, we will show, there will be in general many possible
outcomes. On the contrary if the agenda can be indeﬁnitely repeated until a
cycle is encountered or a local optimum is reached, we will show that cycles
are usually very likely, but when cycles are not encountered the number of
possible local optima is very small.
In order to be more precise, we can characterize the properties of the paths
in the space of policies that emerge out of the procedure informally outlined
above by providing a few deﬁnitions.
Given an organizational structure O : D  → A, we say that the policy
vector x is a preferred neighbor of vector x for agent ak who has control
of the set of policies dk if the following three conditions hold:
1. x  ak y
2. px
ν = py
ν ∀ν / ∈ dk
3. x  = y
Conditions 2 and 3 require that the two vectors diﬀer only by policy
items under the control of agent ak. According to the deﬁnition, a preferred
neighbor can be reached through the decision of a single agent.
We call Hk(xi,ak) the set of preferred neighbors of a vector xi for agent
ak.
8Impossibility may derive from the rule that the agenda can be repeated only once and
therefore after the h − th agent in the agenda has selected his policy item the new status
quo cannot be further modiﬁed, even if some agents would like to do so.
11A path P(xi,O,α) from a vector xi and for an organizational structure
O and an agenda α is a sequence, starting from xi, of preferred neighbors for
the agents in the agenda:
P(xi,O,α) = xi,xi+1,xi+2,... with xi+m+1 ∈ Hai+m+1(xi+m,ai+m+1 ∈ α)
A vector xj is reachable from another vector xi and for the organizational
structure O if there exist a path P(xi,O,α) such that xj ∈ P(xi,O,α).
A path can end up either on a (local) optimum, i.e. a vector which does
not have any preferred neighbor, or in a cycle among a set of vectors which
are preferred neighbors to each other.
A vector x is a local optimum for the organization O if there does not
exist a vector y such that y ∈ H(x,ak) for any agent ak in the agenda.
A cycle is a set X0 = {x0
1,x0
2,...,x0








In the following sections we will show that paths and their outcomes, that
is the (locally) optimal policy vector that is ﬁnally chosen, or the emergence
of a cycle, can be highly manipulated by the principal either by changing
the allocation of agents to diﬀerent policies or by giving the appropriate
monetary incentives. We will ﬁrst examine the case in which the principal
“knows what she wants” and does not modify her preferences. We will show
that, in general, the principal may obtain policy vectors that are equal or
very close to the ones she prefers at no or very small cost by appropriately
modifying the allocation of decision rights. Incentives and organizational
structure appear therefore as substitutes. Then we will consider the situation
in which the principal “does not know what she wants”, i.e. tries to learn
from the environment which policy vectors perform better.
4 Getting what you want when you know what
you want
Let us ﬁrst examine the case in which the principal precisely knows the set
of policies she wants to be implemented either because she has the right
knowledge of the environment, i.e. her ordering over the space of policy
vectors corresponds to their true performance value, or because she simply
wants her preferred policy to be implemented, whatever the result.
The principal has two means of achieving this goal: she can act on the
incentives and/or she can act on the organizational structure. In the former
12case the principal tries to align the agents’s decisions to her preferences by
giving the agents monetary incentives to do so. In the latter case the principal
chooses an appropriate allocation of decision rights to the agents. Let us ﬁrst
show, by means of a few examples, that the principal can to a large extent
manipulate the agent’s decision and obtain a policy proﬁle equal or very close
to her preferred vector without providing extra incentives.
Consider ﬁrst a very simple example in which 3 agents have a common
most preferred choice, which is not the preferred option of the principal.
Table 1 presents their individual preferences, ranked from the most to the
least preferred outcome:
Order Agent1 Agent2 Agent3 Principal
1st 011 011 011 000
2nd 111 000 010 101
3rd 000 001 100 111
4th 010 110 101 110
5th 100 010 000 100
6th 110 111 110 001
7th 101 101 111 010
8th 001 100 001 011
Table 1: An example of the emergence of diﬀerent local optima
All the agents prefer vector [0,1,1] to any other option, but this vector
is the least preferred one by the principal. This looks indeed like a bad
situation for the principal and apparently she could get better outcomes
only by incurring high incentive costs, but at a closer scrutiny we notice that
the principal can actually avoid such costs.
Consider for instance the organizational structure {a1 ← {p1},a2 ←
{p2},a3 ← {p3}, with agenda (a1,a2,a3) and the initial status quo [1,1,0].
Agent 1 decides ﬁrst and chooses to switch to 0 the policy p1 under his con-
trol (because [1,1,0] ≺a1 [0,1,0]), then agent 2 switches to 0 the policy p2
under his control. The policy vector has now become [0,0,0] and agent 3
will not further modify it because [0,0,1] ≺a3 [0,0,0], neither will agents 1
and 2: [0,0,0] is a local optimum for this organizational structure and the
principal can obtain it at no cost, even if it is dominated by another policy
vector for all the agents.
Actually it is easy to verify that [0,0,0] is the local optimum that the
organization reaches from six out of eight initial conditions. Only for initial
13conditions [0,1,1] and [1,1,1] will the organization reach the other local
optimum [0,1,1], which is the most preferred one by all the agents.
The same result of two local optima [0,0,0] and [0,1,1] could be obtained
for instance with the organizational structure {a1 ← {p1,p2},a2 ← {p3}}
and agenda (a1,a2). On the contrary, the organizational structures {a1 ←
{p1},a2 ← {p2,p3}} and, obviously, {ai ← {p1,p2,p3}} ∀i ∈ {1,2,3} possess
the unique global optimum [0,1,1].
Actually, stronger results can be shown. It is indeed possible to provide
cases in which the same group of agents can generate diﬀerent global optima
(i.e. optima that are stably reached from any initial condition) or cycles,
depending upon the organizational structure. One such example may be
illustrated by table 2 that summarizes the preferences of three hypothetical
agents:
Order Agent1 Agent2 Agent3
1st 001 000 001
2nd 110 111 110
3rd 000 001 000
4th 010 010 010
5th 100 100 100
6th 011 011 011
7th 111 101 111
8th 101 110 101
Table 2: Emergence of cycles or diﬀerent global optima
It is easy to verify that this triple of agents (note that agents 1 and 3 are
identical) may either generate a cycle, or the vector [0,0,1] as unique global
optimum or the vector [0,0,0] as another unique global optimum given three
diﬀerent organization structures. A principal could get one of these very
diﬀerent outcomes simply by changing the organizational structure.
Structure {a1 ← {p1,p2},a2 ← {p3}} always generates the cycle [0,0,1] →
[0,0,0] → [1,1,0] → [1,1,1] → [0,0,1]. It is therefore a structure in which
intra-organizational conﬂict does never settle into an equilibrium, unless a
stopping rule is provided. Structure {a1 ← {p1},a2 ← {p2},a3 ← {p3}} has
the unique global optimum [0,0,1] that is reached from every initial condition,
whereas structure {a1 ← {p1},a2 ← {p2,p3} also produces a unique global
optimum but a diﬀerent one, i.e. vector [0,0,0].
14We cannot here provide more general results, but in Marengo and Set-
tepanella (2010) it is formally proven, by using some properties of the ge-
ometry of hyperplanes arrangements and in the slightly diﬀerent context of
social choice with majority voting, that any kind of cycle can always be bro-
ken by appropriate changes of what we call here organizational structure and
necessary and suﬃcient conditions are given for any vector (e.g. the princi-
pal’s most preferred policy proﬁle) to be a global or local optimum for an
appropriate organizational structure.
So far we have simply provided some examples crafted in such a way as
to show the possibility of manipulation of the outcome of the organizational
decision processes by diﬀerently allocating decision rights. One could wonder
how general this results are and how this manipulation could complement or
substitute the manipulation that may be achieved by incentives, i.e. by
modifying the agents’ choices through alteration of their payoﬀ landscape.
In order to answer this question we investigate the general properties of
random populations of agents and principals. We simulate randomly gener-
ated problems with n = 8 policy items and up to eight agents with randomly
generated preferences. We test the following organizational structures with
1, 2, 4 and 8 agents9:
• O1: a1 ← {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8}
• O2: a1 ← {1,2,3,4},a2 ← {5,6,7,8} with agenda α = a1,a2
• O4: a1 ← {1,2},a2 ← {3,4},a3 ← {5,6},a4 ← {7,8} with agenda
α = a1,a2,a3,a4
• O8: a1 ← {1},a2 ← {2},a3 ← {3},a4 ← {4},a5 ← {5},a6 ←
{6},a7 ← {7},a8 ← {8} with agenda α = a1,a2,...,a8
In the sequel we will study the properties of decision making in randomly
generated policy landscapes (that is nature’s preferences). In each case we
will study the outcome for every initial status quo and we will repeat the
exercise for 1000 diﬀerent randomly generated problems.
We ﬁrst consider the case in which the agenda may be endlessly repeated
until a local optimum or a cycle are encountered. Under such rule, cycles are
9When only a subset of the eight agents are employed, i.e. in all organizational struc-
ture but the one designated by O8, the assignment of agents to the elements of the
decomposition is also made randomly.
15very frequent when decision rights are highly partitioned as in organization
O8, they become less frequent with coarser partitions and disappear when
all decisions are delegated to a single agent. When cycles do not appear, the
number of local optima is always small. Table 3 summarizes these results by
presenting the average number of cycles (with standard deviations in brack-
ets) and the share of initial conditions leading to a cycle obtained over 1000
diﬀerent randomly generated problems for the four organizational structures.
For instance, the ﬁrst line tells that with organizational structure O8, 78%
of the 256,000 simulated paths (256 initial status quo times 1000 repetitions
with diﬀerent randomly generated agents) lead to a cycle. When cycles are
not encountered, paths may lead on average to 2.78 diﬀerent local optima.
Of course with structure O1 simulated paths always end on the only agent’s
most preferred policy vector.













Table 3: Number of local optima for diﬀerent organizations
(n=8, 1000 repetitions, standard deviation in brackets)
Of course in all cases organizational outcomes are on average far both from
the principal’s most preferred and from the best performers according to na-
ture’s policy vectors, as we did not introduce any mechanisms for aligning
them. If we introduce incentives it should be possible to align organizational
outcomes with the principal’s objectives. Indeed this obviously happens:
as incentives grow, also control of organizational policy by the principal in-
creases. Table 4 shows the increase of control for organizational structure O8
as incentives increase. Control is measured by the average distance (in terms
of diﬀerence between ranks) between the realized policy and the principal’s
most preferred one (0 meaning full control), whereas incentives are measured
by the maximum sum the principal is willing to pay each agent for aligning
his choice to her preferences (255 being the maximum amount for always
16inducing any agent having to choose between two policies to select the one
preferred by the principal). Note that, in general, when decision rights are
highly partitioned like in O8, full control cannot be achieved because of in-
terdependencies (externalities) among agents: each agent can be induced to
choose the policies the principal prefers but only within the policies under his
control and given the current status quo of the policies outside his control.
Because of externalities, this procedure might never generate, and therefore
select, the policy vector the principal ranks highest.
Incentive Average No. of Share of





















Table 4: Incentives, control, local optima and cycles for
organization O8
(n=8, 1000 repetitions, standard deviation in brackets)
Table 4 also shows that stronger incentives have another interesting and
non obvious eﬀect: they sharply decrease the likelihood of cycles and on the
other hand increase the number of local optima. Incentives tend to prevent
cycles and at the same time they increase the manipulability of decisions: as
the number of local optima increases, the principal may more easily induce
agents to select autonomously a local optima close to her own most preferred
policy vector.
Very similar results are obtained for organizational structures O4 and O2,
where with the highest incentives (255) average control is, respectively, 3.75
(standard deviation 0.85) and 0.47 (standard deviation 0.15), the number
of local optima is 32.73 and 12.13 and the percentage of cycles is 4.7% and
1.7%. Organizational structure O1 instead always presents only 1 optimum
and no cycles. With strong incentives, full control (average 0.0 and standard
deviation 0.0) is always achieved because with only one agent externalities
do not exist.
17These results have been obtained assuming that the agenda is repeated
over and over until a local optimum or a cycle are reached, and we saw
that cycles are in general very likely especially with highly decentralized
structures. Of course an easy way to prevent cycles from occurring is to
forbid the reiteration of the agenda: once all agents have taken their decision
according to the order stated by the agenda the procedure comes to a halt
and no further modiﬁcations to the policy vector are allowed.
This procedure produces very diﬀerent results. Table 5 shows the results
of simulations in which each agent is allowed to decide only once and in the
order stated by the agenda and incentives are set to 0. Of course cycles
cannot emerge with such a halting rule and simulations show that decision
processes can end up in about 42 diﬀerent policy vectors (not necessarily
local optima, as the process is truncated) for organization O8, 28 for O4, 10
for O2 and, obviously, only 1 for O1.













Table 5: Number of local optima without agenda reiteration and
without incentives
(n=8, 1000 repetitions, standard deviation in brackets)
The table clearly shows the source of a possible ”divide and conquer”
strategy by the principal: by partitioning more ﬁnely decision rights and
hiring more agents, each of them with responsibility on only very few poli-
cies, the principal can more easily and cheaply manipulate the organization’s
decision. The table shows the sharp increase in the number of local optima
that can be obtained with more ﬁne grained organizational structures and
therefore higher possibility of ﬁnding a local optimum equal or close enough
to the principal’s most preferred policy proﬁle. By exploiting this feature,
the principal has the possibility of getting high levels of control and perfor-
mance without using any extra monetary incentive. The following table 6
18provides evidence in this direction. The table presents averages and standard
deviations of the best control and performance achieved in each simulated
problem. By best control we mean the diﬀerence between the rank, in the
principal’s preference ordering, of the ﬁnally implemented policy vector and
the rank of the principal’s most preferred vector (which is always 1, by con-
struction). By best performance instead we mean the diﬀerence between
the rank, in nature’s preference ordering, of the ﬁnally implemented policy
vector and the rank of nature’s most preferred vector (which is always 1, by
construction). In all the simulations summarized in the table incentives have
been set to zero.





















Table 6: Best control and best performance, without incentives
(n=8, 1000 repetitions, standard deviation in brackets)
Table 6 shows that high control and/or high performance can be achieved
at zero incentives in organizational structures where decisions are highly
partitioned, whereas if all decisions are delegated to one single agent best
control and performance are random. Note that average control and average
performance are the same (around 128.5, that is the median rank) for all
structures, but best control and best performance are very diﬀerent. This
implies that, whereas in organization O1 the principal can only use incentives
in order to get high control and high performance, in organizations with
ﬁner partitions of decision rights, and in particular in O8, the principal has
the possibility of achieving high control and performance by acting on the
distribution of decisions and on the initial status quo, without providing any
extra incentive. All in all, in this case organizational structure and incentives
are largely substitutes.
195 Adaptively learning principal
Let us now turn to the more interesting and realistic case in which the prin-
cipal does not know the “right” model of the world and is aware of such
ignorance. She holds an ordering of the policy vectors that does not cor-
respond to their true relative performance, i.e. the principal’s ordering is
diﬀerent from nature’s. Thus the principal tries to learn the correct ordering
by a simple trial-and-error mechanism that will be explained below. When
learning is in place, along with trying to have her preferred policies imple-
mented, the principal also tries to sample the performance value of diﬀerent
policy vectors in order to adaptively learn from the environmental feed-backs
and avoid lock-in into inferior policies. This determines a complex trade-oﬀ
between aligning the agents’ decisions to the principal’s preferences or letting
agents more free to choose policies according to their own idiosyncratic pref-
erences. If, by means of appropriate incentive and/or organizational struc-
tures, the principal optimizes such alignment she will have her preferred
policies eﬃciently implemented, but agents who may hold better models of
the environment and could implement policies with higher performance may
be forced into the straightjacket of the principal’s vision. On the other hand,
if the principal, by means of looser incentives and/or appropriate organiza-
tional structures, leaves higher freedom to the agents of implementing their
own preferred policies, she may learn that some of the agents’ ideas may
actually perform better in the environment. However she may loose control
of the organization and the latter may be ﬁnally oriented by some agents to
serve their own views and interests.
In this section we examine this trade-oﬀ and analyze in particular how
the choice of incentives and the choice of organizational structure interact
together in striking a balance in this trade-oﬀ. We will assume a very simple
learning mechanism for the principal: if at two successive moments in time t
and t+τ two diﬀerent policy vectors xt and xt+τ are implemented with xt  =
xt+τ, the principal may check if their performance levels (nature’s ordering)
are in line with her preferences and swap their positions in her ranking if
they are not. On the contrary we assume that agents do not learn and keep
their preferences unchanged10.
10An extension of the present model by allowing that also agents are exposed to en-
vironmental signal (possibly mediated by the principal) and adaptively learn will be the
object of future research.
20We measure learning with the dynamics of Spearman’s rank correlation
between nature’s and the principal’s orderings of policy vectors. A Spearman
coeﬃcient equal to 0 means that the two rankings have no correlation, a
coeﬃcient equal to 1 that their correlation is maximal.
Let us begin the analysis by assuming that the agenda can be reiterated
until an optimum or a cycle are met. We noticed in the previous section that
when the agenda is reiterated cycles are frequently encountered, especially in
structures with high partitioning of decisions. When the organization enters
in a cycle it is impossible to give a precise deﬁnition of learning, as the policy
vector does not stabilize. Thus we will consider only the cases in which a
local optimum, rather than a cycle, is the ﬁnal outcome.
With this caveat, table 7 summarizes the main results, showing the ﬁnal
Spearman coeﬃcient after decision and learning has taken place starting
from every possible initial status quo vector. Since initially all agents, the
principal and nature are randomly generated, Spearman’s coeﬃcient at the
outset is very close to 0 (0.003 with standard deviation 0.063 in this bunch
of simulations).

















































Table 7: Learning, organization, and incentives. With agenda
reiteration
(n=8, 1000 repetitions, standard deviation in brackets)
Table 7 shows two main results: ﬁrst that learning is higher in the or-
ganizational structure O8 and, second, that its relationship with incentives
22tends to be of an inverted U-shape kind. As to the former result, we noticed
in the previous section that the number of local optima is highest with or-
ganizational structure O8 and therefore also the sampling of diﬀerent policy
vectors is highest with such a structure. At the opposite side, with struc-
ture O1 there is always only one optimum, regardless the level of incentives,
and therefore there cannot be any sampling and any learning at all. It is
worth stressing again that these results concern only cases in which an opti-
mum is reached, and in organization O8 most of the time a cycle is instead
encountered.
As to the relationship with incentives, we observed in the previous section
that under agenda reiteration stronger incentive produce more local optima
and this is reﬂected by higher learning. However, when incentives are very
high such an eﬀect is oﬀset by stronger control that induces agents to actu-
ally select only very few of such local optima. Thus an inverted U-shape of
the function which maps the level of incentives into learning. Higher incen-
tives also seem to make learning more predictable, as witnessed by the lower
standard deviations.
Let us now turn to learning without agenda reiteration. We saw in the
previous section that in such a setting the number of actually implemented
policy vectors tends to be much higher than in the case with agenda reiter-
ation, except for organizational structure O1 in which there always is only
one vector implemented. This translates into much higher learning than in
the case with agenda reiteration, as shown by Table 8. The eﬀect of incen-
tives is instead analogous to the one of Table 7, though the maximum level
of learning seems to be reached for lower levels of incentives.

















































Table 8: Learning, organization, and incentives. Without agenda
reiteration
(n=8, 1000 repetitions, standard deviation in brackets)
Table 7 and 8 show the average ﬁnal outcomes of the learning processes of
1000 diﬀerent randomly generated problems. If we observe a single learning
24process results are conﬁrmed. The following ﬁgures 1 and 2 show one typical
learning process for the diﬀerent organizational structures respectively at
0 and maximum (255) levels of incentives. Figures show that the learning




































Figure 1: Learning and organizational structures with incentive level 0
To summarize the results obtained in this and the previous section, we
could say that organizational structures in which the decisions are ﬁnely
partitioned show an advantage for the principal in terms of higher manip-
ulability and higher opportunities for achieving high levels of control and
performance without relying too much on costly incentives. But such struc-
tures also present a dynamic advantage in terms of learning, especially when


























Figure 2: Learning and organizational structures with maximum incentive
level
6 Externalities and the complexity of the or-
ganizational landscape
A recent stream of research has investigated how organizations can adapt
and learn in complex environments in which the performance of the organiza-
tion is the outcome of the interaction among organizational traits (Levinthal
1997, Levinthal and Warglien 1999, Gavetti and Levinthal 2000, Marengo and
Dosi 2005, Rivkin and Siggelkow 2005). This literature has shown that when
such interactions are widespread, non-linear, and imperfectly known, orga-
nizational processes of learning and adaptation take place in performance
landscapes characterized by multiple local optima, and, therefore, by sub-
optimality, path-dependency, and high sensitivity to small environmental
perturbations. However this literature assumes that such interdependencies
are exogenously determined by the nature of the “problem” the organization
faces or of the“technology” (in the broad sense) it employs.
In this paper we have added to this “cognitive” source of complexity a po-
litical one, that is the complexity arising from the interdependencies among
26agents. In our model there is a sort of internal and political organizational
landscape, whose ruggedness or smoothness is quite independent from the
ruggedness or smoothness of the exogenous performance landscape the orga-
nization faces.
So far we have reported results of simulations in which agents are all ran-
domly generated without any restriction but transitivity of their individual
preferences. This determines environments of maximal complexity, in the
sense that externalities tend to involve all policies and all agents. In this sec-
tion we brieﬂy analyze how diﬀerent organizational structures and incentives
perform when such complexity varies in intensity 11.
We have already analyzed in the previous sections how interdependencies
among agents generate intra-organizational decision landscapes with multiple
local optima and/or intransitive cycles. If on the other hand such externali-
ties do not exist, cycles and multiple local optima do not appear and control
by the principal becomes easier and cheaper.
Suppose for instance that in organizational structure O8 each agent is
concerned only with the policy under his control: agent ai has random pref-
erences between 0 and 1 for policy pi (for every i = 1,2,...,8) but is indif-
ferent on the choices of the other policies. If no incentives are provided the
organization settles into the unique optimum in which each agent chooses his
own preferred value for the policy under his control, but at a minimum cost
the principal can induce each agent whose choice for policy pi diﬀers from
the principal preferred value to switch to the other value. At an average cost
of c·n
2 the principal can obtain her own most preferred policy vector as the
unique organizational outcome.
A similar result, although with higher incentive costs, can be found in
all cases in which the distribution of externalities and the distribution of
decision rights coincide: if an agent is concerned with a subset of policies he
should be allocated decision rights on those policies in order to minimize the
cost of control.
However, whenever externalities and decision rights are perfectly aligned
and incentives are set to optimize control, the organization can experience
only a unique optimal outcome. Thus learning – in our strictly adaptive
model – becomes impossible. In order to allow learning to take place the prin-
11Indeed there exist already examples of models that concentrate on the complexity
of the intra-organizational decision making processes, see for instance Burton and Obel
(1980) or Radner (1993)
27cipal must set incentives to a lower level (thus losing some control) and/or
choosing an allocation of decision rights that is ﬁner than the scope of ex-
ternalities12. Just to give an example, if each agent is concerned with two
policy issues but is allocated only one of them (thus generating externalities
between couples of agents), a ﬁnal Spearman coeﬃcient of 0.59 is on average
achieved between the principal’s and nature’s preferences at zero incentives,
and 0.46 with incentives higher or equal to c   2.
Thus, in our model, the organizational design principle of internalizing
externalities which is one of the main prescriptions of transaction costs eco-
nomics, is indeed justiﬁed in terms of control optimization 13 but not in terms
of adaptive learning. In order to increase the level of exploration and fos-
ter adaptive learning, externalities should not be entirely internalized within
separated decision units.
7 Conclusions and directions for further re-
search
In this paper we have introduced a model that studies the interplay between
learning, incentives and allocation of decision rights (the organizational struc-
ture) in a generalized agency problem whereby principals and agents have
diverging views of the right courses of action for the organization, rather
than simply conﬂicting interests.
Our main results could be summarized as follows. When learning is not
at stake, incentives and organizational structure are substitutes. Diverging
views among the principal and the agents may be to a large extent diluted
by careful organizational design and incentives may be used as secondary
devices. Somehow our model tends to support the idea that rules and orga-
nization may be more important than incentives in order to align individual
behaviors to a common goal.
When instead learning is at stake, organizational structure and incentives
may complement each other and have to be ﬁne tuned according to the
complexity of the learning process and the competitive pressure which is put
12A similar argument can be found in Cohen (1984) who argues that some degree of
conﬂict may be a fundamental source for organizational learning.
13We have already remarked, however, that if externalities are very diﬀused, e.g. every
agent’s utility depends on all policies, achieving perfect control may require very costly
incentives.
28on fast or slow learning.
The model is rather rich and only a subset of possible research questions
have been examined in the present paper. Among the possible lines of further
research is the introduction of some learning process also for the agents,
possibly with partial environmental feed-back only on the policies under their
control. One should also consider the costs of hiring agents that are likely
to depend on their span of control. Agents that are given responsibility of
larger sets of policies are likely to be more costly, whereas in the present
paper such costs have not been considered.
Finally, it would be interesting to model the organizational structure itself
as subject to learning. The allocation of decision rights could be modiﬁed
adaptively, for instance by taking one policy item out of the control of one
agent and giving it to the control of another randomly selected agent. This
would introduce a new learning process, certainly slower (the space of or-
ganizational structures is larger than the space of policies) but that could
interact in non trivial ways with the learning of policy proﬁles. This will be
the subject of future work.
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